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The European Anti- Fraud Office (OLAF) is anadministrative investigatory institution, with nocriminal powers. In order to strengthen fraud pre-
vention, OLAF was established by the European
Commission via the European Commission, ECSC
Decision 1999/352 of April 28, 1999 (see
http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/index_en.html for further
details). The office was given a special independent status
to conduct administrative anti-fraud investigations. OLAF
has the power to carry out limited checks and inspections,
including “on the spot” checks in Member States and in
non-Member States, provided cooperation agreements
exist (regulation no 2185/96). There has been an ambition
to develop a European Public Prosecutor (see Green paper
on criminal law protection of the financial interests of the
Community and the establishment of a European
Prosecutor, Commission of the European Communities,
2001) which would potentially grant OLAF criminal inves-
tigatory power. For the moment OLAF relies on Member
States to prosecute cases, and it is the Member States
which bear the financial burden.
In the following paper I will discuss the following con-
ceptualisation of investigative cultures based on experience
at OLAF and general policing culture. This is inspired from
a combination of five months as a trainee at OLAF, where
I conducted interviews with all 17 investigators in my unit,
and the literature on the organisation of policing, plus
work done at the Universities Police Science Institute in
Cardiff University’s School of Social Sciences.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Why does OLAF as an administrative body fight so hard
for criminal sanctions? It is both costly and results are pro-
portionately few (32% of cases in 2009 received judicial
follow up- though we cannot be sure what “following and
assisting the progress of cases with the competent national
authorities” entails – see OLAF annual report 2010). If we
expand on an example from the UK, HMRC staff conduct
their financial investigations with the supposed aim of
maximising revenue to the state; pragmatically, compliance
and settlement are more important than investigation and
prosecution. Shapiro described prosecutions by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in the US as “the
road not taken” in typical insider dealing or market abuse
cases (see Shapiro, S, “The road not taken: the elusive path
to criminal prosecution for white-collar offenders”, (1985)
The Law and Society Review, 9(2): 179-218). Why does
OLAF orient itself to march down this road? At the time
of Shapiro’s writing, six in every 100 parties investigated
stood judgment before a criminal court and the remaining
94 were dealt with by civil sanctions, administratively or
not at all. As OLAF does not have prosecution powers, why
not simply work on regulatory sanctions rather than crim-
inal justice? A key question which follows is: what impact
does the fight for criminal sanctions have on OLAF inves-
tigators and on their targets?
OLAF lies in a regulation versus crime control middle
ground, akin to Gill’s discussion of the blurring between
regulation and policing (see Gill, P, “Policing and regula-
tion: what is the difference?” (2002) Social Legal Studies,
11(4) 523-46): and between an overwhelmingly regulatory
body such as the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and a
crime control body such as the Serious Fraud Office
(SFO), part of the UK criminal justice system. Of course
there is no relationship between crime seriousness and
actual prosecution risks (Tombs, S, “’Violence’, safety
crimes and criminology”, (2007) British Journal of
Criminology, 47: 4 531-50). Braithwaite (1984) related
Roosevelt’s phrase “walking softly while carrying a big
stick” to compliance strategies and regulation. The size of
the OLAF stick is unknown, and is one which they have to
ask permission to use, as they have to convince Member
States to proceed with criminal prosecution, modifying the
tough image OLAF would like to have. Though the impact
of the threat of prosecution versus civil sanctions on deter-
rence is under researched in this area (see Levi, M “Serious
tax fraud and non-compliance; a review of evidence on the
differential impact of criminal and non-criminal proceed-
ings”, Criminology and Public Policy, (2010), 9(3): 493-513
for a review in the tax context), general literature suggests
that criminals usually overestimate the likelihood of detec-
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tion and sanction. If this applies to the crime OLAF inves-
tigates, then surely its existence would be enough to deter,
unless the criminals decide to ignore the risks and conse-
quences as they think they are smarter and don’t care about
the sanctions. The OLAF case load reveals that this is not
the case: more could be done if we are to go down this
route of deterrence.
To make sure you have the threat of a big stick in this con-
text, you need to secure a clear knowledge that your inves-
tigations can and will lead to prosecution when “needed.”
In OLAF’s case, prosecution is not clear cut, takes many
years and often single offenders are not fined or prose-
cuted. OLAF’s limited case law reflects little use of crimi-
nal sanctions big enough to “symbolically signify acts which
are unacceptable” (Tombs, 2007). Even when this does
happen, this is not presented to insiders or outsiders in a
digestible format. In failing to make its successes clear,
OLAF fails to show whatever size stick it has, which does
not sit well with investigator morale. On the other hand, in
not publicising the size and direction of its stick, OLAF is
able to continue to keep undercover the fact that it may not
be very big.
Whichever side of the coin is the “reality”, on speaking
with OLAF investigators this has a great impact on the way
they see their work. There is no space to go into this in
detail, but further influences on investigator morale
include likening OLAF to a machine, where the outside
decision making parts (the council, parliament, and the
commission) are moving slower and at times in a different
direction to its internal components or cogs. The slow
pace and direction of change, the administrative burden
which follows and the uncertainty of the size of OLAF’s
stick effects its internal components (ie the investigators)
differently. The “administrative burden” I refer to is the
four different systems used on a daily basis (time manage-
ment system, case management system, core business
information system and data protection) which leaves
investigators tied down to paper work they consider
unnecessary, including a heavily internally debated system
of “data protection.”
The nature of the complex frauds, including those inves-
tigated by OLAF, determines that regulation is often the
only method of sanction available. The most successful
cases are where a “mixed economy” of sanctions is
deployed. By “successful” I mean those cases which
recover money and have a “moral and symbolic quality”
(Croall, H, “Combating financial crime: regulatory versus
crime control approaches, (2003) Journal of Financial
Crime, 11(1): 45-55), with the use administrative as well
as criminal sanctions: this is positive for the public and
investigators. Such outcomes arise where many resources
are devoted, regulatory sanctions are imposed immediately
(during the investigation) and evidence is then gathered for
a criminal case file. This is rare, and takes the immediate
and extremely close cooperation of the Directorate
General (DG) involved. As with many OLAF cases, they
depend on relationships between individuals; the investiga-
tor’s ability to “sell” the case not only to the DG but to the
Member States (and also to non-Member States when rel-
evant). Without this close cooperation, the case fails to
progress even when jumping through the relevant hoops
(such as the 9-monthly case reviews). OLAF depends on
their counterparts in the DGs passing information on and
helping them understand contracts. This contributes to
mounting pressure on the investigators if they want to be
successful; investigators react to this in different ways.
From this I now turn to the conceptual framework of the
investigative cultures typology I have developed.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
My research was conducted over a five month period.
This involved semi-structured interviews with all members
of the unit I worked in, as well as three other heads of unit
in my directorate. I also had informal conversations with
approximately 30 other members of staff, including the
heads of most units throughout the organisation. I was
granted access to conduct semi-structured interviews with
my own unit by the unit head. Access for interviewing the
other heads of unit was granted by the head of the
Directorate. These interviews were granted in order for
me to gather basic unit information for in-house purposes.
However, it meant that I was able to ask some of my own
questions. A key limitation to my research and data analy-
sis was that the confidential data could not leave the insti-
tution, and no software was available for computer
qualitative analysis. Broad themes were extracted and
analysed similarly to the process within narrative analysis
(see Gubrium, J F, and Holstein, J A, Analyzing Narrative
Reality, Sage Publications (2009)). Previous literature on
the themes which came out of the data discussed had res-
onance with The Politics of the Police (Reiner, R, 3rd ed,
Oxford University Press, 2000). Therefore the following
fourfold typology was constructed which could be used as
a tool for future research.
INVESTIGATIVE CULTURES
This fourfold typology has titles I have adapted from
Reiner’s writing on “cop culture” within the organisation
of policing to fit my observations of OLAF staff:
1. Police missionaries
2. Pessimistic investigators
3. Pragmatist administrators
4. The withdrawers
Police missionaries
These are the most positive group, who are constantly
striving to fight, punish and deter fraudsters, and prison
sentences are held as their ideal outcome. They are hard-
working enthusiasts self-described as aiming to be dutiful
to their public service role, are from policing backgrounds
and so are used to having criminal investigation powers.18
Amicus Curiae Issue 85 Spring 2011
19
Amicus Curiae Issue 85 Spring 2011
Therefore these investigators often feel frustrated in their
new role, and try not to begrudge obstacles they face to
completing their work, holding great regard for their serv-
ice vocation. OLAF’s limited powers, the high administra-
tive burden (especially that on the few powers OLAF does
have at its disposal), and the investigative/ working cultures
of others in the office weigh heavily on this group, pushing
down morale.
Pessimistic investigators
These are investigators who are a stage further into
accepting their new role. However instead of keeping the
enthusiasm up, seem somewhat resigned to the constraints
they now face. They are prone to gossip or, conversely,
silence as coping mechanisms in the office environment,
and are often nostalgic about investigatory work they
would rather be doing and express their fondness for pre-
vious exploits.
Pragmatist administrators
These are those who are comfortable with the work and
its administrative capacity, are typically from accounting or
auditing backgrounds, used to conducting work with a high
level of bureaucracy with limited criminal investigation
powers if any. They do not see any need for there to be less
paper work, and feel they are able to be successful in their
investigations with the tools at hand. They are comfortable
with the administrative sanctions and regulation as investi-
gation outcomes, and are the most successful in coping
with the OLAF environment.
Withdrawers who practise easing behaviour
This investigative culture (see Cain, M, Society and the
Policeman’s Role, Routledge and Keegan, (1973)) is the
smallest number of investigators and least popular with
others. These are the people ticking boxes and/or avoiding
work, unwilling to take authority when in positions of
power and are the most problematic for OLAF. Staff are
seldom questioned in OLAF regarding their work; there
are few checks, and justifications reportedly are always
accepted. This kind of “easing behaviour” seems to come
from personal temperament and/or a way of adapting to
the frustrations inherent in OLAF’s environment. This
group are not all malicious, and this section is mostly taken
up with those who are trying to make life easier, when
faced with a tough administrative burden to delve through,
with modest outputs even when they work hard.
CONCLUSION
What I would like to make clear is my interest in the way
OLAF is developing and what this will mean internally.
What impact would OLAF prosecution powers have on
investigations if granted by a European Public Prosecutor?
Would they then become more effective for prevention and
deterrence as the police missionaries hope? If prosecution
powers were at its disposal, maybe this would increase the
morale of the police background investigators, but leave
the “pragmatist administrators” more uncomfortable (even
though the extra burden of developing cases for prosecu-
tion might limit the number of cases investigated).
Currently, OLAF has some investigators keenly focused on
criminal sanctions they rarely achieve, and thus frustrated
workers alongside contented ones.
The European Public Prosecutor will be based at
Eurojust and would still not enable OLAF to prosecute
cases themselves. OLAF would still have to pass on the case
to another body, even if more direct as it is on a European
level (instead of on a national level). OLAF’s mind set is
directed towards a prosecution role; and criminal prosecu-
tion may remain the road not taken, like tax or social secu-
rity frauds. Without a huge transformation, these cases are
often too expensive and labour intensive to get them to a
prosecution standard. Perhaps cultural aspects of investiga-
tor morale and decision making should receive a higher
priority in recruitment and management of this important
body which seeks diligently to control a vast EU budget.
Finally, the following questions are posed in the hope of
future research:
• What would happen if OLAF lost the threat of
criminal sanctions; what if it was just regulatory?
Would this mean they should employ fewer
investigators with policing backgrounds if they want to
keep up staff morale?
• How much impact do criminal sanctions have, and
could there not be parallel criminal investigations run
elsewhere, perhaps in collaboration with OLAF?
• What is the real cost of having staff with low morale?
For now it seems to me that OLAF has valuable
resources which it could utilise more effectively with
an eye focused solely on regulation. This has been a
discussion of investigator morale; what requires
further analysis is what works in preventing “police
missionaries” from turning into “pessimistic
investigators.”
• The views expressed in this paper do not reflect those
of the European Anti-Fraud Office.
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